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Abstract
Following the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union obligated itself to lower its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 20% below
their 1990 level, by the year 2020. Carbon dioxide is the major GHG. To fulfill this obligation, the nations must meet the
sustainability challenge of countering rising population plus affluence with the dematerialization of less energy per GDP plus
the decarbonization of less carbon per energy. To test the feasibility of meeting the challenge, we analyzed carbon dioxide
emission during 1993–2004. Although emissions in the entire Union grew only by an average of 0.31% per year, emissions
and their drivers varied markedly among the 27 member states. Dematerialization and decarbonization did occur, but not
enough to offset the slight population growth plus rapidly increasing affluence. To fulfill its obligation in the next 12 years, the
EU27 would have to counter its increasing population and affluence by a combined dematerialization and decarbonization
1.9–2.6 times faster than during 1993–2004. Hence, fulfilling its obligation by addressing fossil carbon emissions alone is
very unlikely.
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1. Introduction
Human-inflicted greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have caused most of the temperature rise since the middle of
the 20th century. Temperatures are expected to further increase (IPCC, 2007). In 1996, the European
commission recommended that rise in global temperature should be limited to 2°C above the pre-industrial level.
In March 2007, the EU Prime Ministers agreed upon a post-Kyoto target, a commitment of a 20% reduction of
GHG emissions during 1990–2020. On the condition that other countries also commit to reductions, they agreed
that the EU countries should reduce GHG emissions by 30% for the period. However, specic details on how the
common reduction burden would be shared between member states should still be decided. Also, it has not
been decided how the mitigation measures will address CO2, other GHGs and land cover sinks. The CO2
emissions from combustion of fossil fuels are responsible for approximately three-quarters of all GHG emissions.
Currently, the European Union consists of 27 member states that altogether account for approximately 16% of
global CO2 emissions (EIA, 2007; EEA, 2007). The enlargement of the European Union is only one of the
profound historical changes that have shaken the continent over the past two decades. In the early 1990s, the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the iron curtain and the war in former Yugoslavia transformed the
map of Europe.
This study looks at European CO2 emissions during 1993–2004 and includes in the analysis all current 27
member states, here referred to as EU27. In the early 1990s the union only comprised 12 countries. Austria,
Finland and Sweden entered the Union in 1995. Later, in 2004, the Union expanded again as Cyprus, Malta and
eight Central and East European countries entered the EU. Finally, the EU attained its current form, when
Romania and Bulgaria joined the community in 2007. In this case, it is practical to treat the European Union as
two separate entities: the 15 old member states, which committed themselves to the Kyoto protocol as one
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2group, hereafter referred to as EU152, and the 12 more recent arrivals, hereafter referred to as New Member
States, or NMS123.
The total population of EU27 nations in 2004 was estimated at approximately 486 million (Eurostat, 2007a). At
the same time, real GDP measured in constant prices (year 2000 international dollars as reported in the Penn
World Table, Heston et al., 2007) was approximately $1.06_1013 (10.6 trillion), or around $21,800 per capita. In
2004, total energy consumption was approximately 1170 MToe (EEA, 2007).
The total CO2 emissions within the region, excluding land use and land use change, amounted to approximately
1172 teragrams (Tg) of carbon in 2004. In 1990, EU27 states emitted 1207 Tg of C, but the emissions declined
markedly by year 1993 to 1126 Tg. For the rest of the decade the annual emissions remained fairly constant, but
in the beginning of the new millennium, however, regional emissions quickly rebounded. During the years 1990–
2004, total GHG emissions in EU15 countries decreased in most sectors, especially waste management,
industrial processes and agriculture (EEA, 2006). Although over the same period of time EU15 transport
missions continued to grow (+26% altogether), GHG emissions caused by energy consumption (excluding
transport) decreased by 2%.
1.1. Study objectives
We examine the contribution of changing population, income, consumption and technology to observed changes
in national CO2 emissions within EU27 over the years 1993–2004, referred to below as the ‘study period’. The
numerical analyses of this study refer to CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel combustion and industrial processes. We
apply population scenarios up to the year 2020 as prepared by Eurostat and develop simple economic scenarios
in order to estimate a baseline for the required improvements in dematerialization and decarbonization given the
EU target of -20% cut by 2020. We ask, what kind of improvements in energy and carbon intensity are required
in EU27 in order to reach a reduction of 20% in CO2 emissions by 2020, and how do the requirements compare
to the respective historical improvements as observed. Finally, we discuss the results in relation to opportunities
to address other GHGs and land cover sinks within EU27 countries.
2. Materials and methods
We use the ImPACT model to decompose CO2 emissions in our analysis (Waggoner and Ausubel, 2002). It is a
simple mathematical identity used for describing and predicting the effects of changes in population, affluence,
technology, and the intensity of consumption on change in the environment. ImPACT is a reformulation of the
IPAT model, first introduced by Ehrlich and Holdren (1971).
Variants of IPAT and ImPACT have been used e.g. by Cole and Neumayer (2004) to estimate the population
elasticity of CO2 emissions, by Fan et al. (2006) to analyze the impact factors of CO2 emissions in a stochastic
model and by O’Neill et al. (2001) for projecting future CO2 emissions. The effect of population growth on the
willingness to implement a reduction of CO2 emissions has been discussed by York (2005). The development of
CO2 emissions and its drivers is also discussed in numerous other studies. Other decomposition analyses for
CO2 emissions have been conducted e.g. by Sun (2004), Kawase et al. (2006) and EEA (2006). Raupach et al.
(2007) studied the trends and drivers of CO2 emissions at the global and regional scale, decomposing emissions
to population, affluence, energy intensity of gross domestic product and carbon intensity of energy. They discuss
EU as one region, but exclude Bulgaria and Romania, and the Baltic States of the Former Soviet Union.
2.1. The ImPACT identity and its application
In the ImPACT identity, total environmental impact I is determined as the product of four drivers, P— population,
A— affluence, C— consumers’ intensity of use and T— technologists’ intensity of emission (Table 1):
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where I is measured by CO2 emission, P by population, A by GDP per capita, C by intensity of energy/GDP and
T by CO2/energy. Lowercase letters p, a, c and t represent the annual percentage changes of the four drivers,
which add to the change i of impact. Thus, the Identity dissects the contribution by each of the four drivers to
changing the impact, up or down.
Table 1: Attributes of CO2 emissions and variables that cause them
Symbol Attribute Dimension
State variables
I Impact Tons of carbon
P Population Capita
A Affluence GDP/capita
C Consumers’ intensity of use Toe/capita
T Technologists’ intensity of emissions Tons of C/Toe
Rates of change
p population change Capita (%/yr)
a affluence change GDP/capita (%/yr)
c dematerialization in terms of energy Toe/capita (%/yr)
t decarbonization Tons of carbon/ Toe (%/yr)
To smooth out annual variation and abnormal values at the very beginning or at the very end of the time series,
the overall ‘average’  rate of change for each geographical entity was calculated (formulae (4)–(8), Appendix A).
The capital letters were solved for using 3-year averages for carbon emissions, population, GDP and energy
consumption at the beginning and at the end of the study period. Then, the average annual rate of change in
each component was solved for by dividing the total log% by the length of the studied time period, correcting for
the ‘lost years’  at both ends of the period. In this way the components maintain their multiplicative nature, and
their average rates of change add up to i. Three-year averages for the totals (i.e. total energy consumption or
total emissions of CO2) are used in the calculation of the components to guarantee that the equation remains an
identity. If average annual changes were calculated using 3-year averages of P, A, C and T, this advantageous
feature would be lost.
The total energy consumption figures for EU27 countries are utilized, although emissions are thought to be
generated only in combustion processes of fossil fuels. Thus, changes in intensity of emissions, T, imply
changes in combustion processes (efficiency, type of process, etc.), but also structural changes in the energy
system, such as changes in the mix of fuels, and changes in the proportions of other energy forms, such as
nuclear power, hydropower and imported electricity. The structural composition of the economy affects the
intensity of use, C. Also, the actual energy efficiency of the output in energy sector affects C. Farla and Blok
(2000) found that, in the Netherlands, dematerializations within sectors rather than a shift among sectors
produced the national dematerialization of energy consumption lagging economic output.
2.2. Historical data
The study period covers years 1993–2004, with extensive panel data available for EU27 member states. Data
for CO2 emissions excluding land use, land-use change and forestry were obtained from EEA (2007) and are
reported in Tg of carbon. The historical time series extends from 1993 to 2005. Energy consumption data for
years 1993–2005 were also extracted from Eurostat (2007b). Historical population data for the years 1993–2006
were similarly extracted from Eurostat (2007a). Data for GDP were obtained from Penn World Table for years
1993–2004 and are reported at constant prices in year 2000 international dollars (Heston et al., 2007).
42.3. Scenario analysis
Scenario analyses are here developed for the whole EU27 as one body. Designing more precise, country-
specific assessments on the development of the emission intensity and the intensity of use would require
knowledge of the distribution of the reduction burden and the means that each country adopts to obtain these
goals. We adopt the sustainability challenge approach (Waggoner and Ausubel 2002) to assess the stringency
of the required reductions. In other words, our intention is to find a plausible range for the annual rate of
emission intensity and intensity of use (c+t) required to reach the European Union’s reduction target by 2020,
assuming reasonable scenarios for the development of population and affluence.
For the future development of population, three projections are adopted from Eurostat (2007a). The population
projections kick off where historical population data end, in the year 2006. All three projections use 2004 as their
base year. The Eurostat ‘baseline variant’  projection is our best guess for the future development of population
in all EU27 countries. Population is projected to increase from 489 million in 2006 to 496 million in 2020. To offer
a comparison for this projection, we use Eurostat’s high population and low population variants. In the high
population variant population increases from 490 in 2006 to 516 million in 2020 and in the low population variant
it decreases from 488 in 2006 to 479 million by 2020.
Values for 2006–2008 CO2 and energy consumption are extrapolated by continuing the average development
trend of emissions observed in the last 5 years of historical data. The time series of real GDP was extended to
the years 2005–2006 using real GDP growth rates as reported by Eurostat (2007c), and to 2007–2008 by using
forecasts reported in the same source.
There are differences between EU27 countries in the economic growth potential in the near future. We make
several strong assumptions on how the economies might develop. For projections of the development of total
GDP after 2008, countries are divided into four groups based on the level of their affluence (A) in 2006, the last
year with historical data for GDP and population. The first group4 consists of affluent countries, where A is at
least 90% of the average level of EU15. The second group5 consists of countries where A is between 70 and
90%, the third group6 of countries where A is between 50–70%, and the fourth group7 of countries where A is
less than 50% of the EU15 average.
The countries in Group 1 are considered ‘mature’  economies that grow slower in relative terms than economies
in Groups 2–4. The real GDP of Group 1 is set to grow at a steady-state growth rate (rss), which varies in our
forecast model to simulate slower or faster economic growth. In the first four years, 2009–2012, the real GDP
growth rates of Group 1 countries converge from their country-specific average in 2004–2008 to the rss, after
which growth is maintained at this rate. Affluence or GDP per capita for these countries is defined normally by
the volume of GDP and the forecasted population size in that year.
The other three groups of countries are here set to converge to the average affluence level of Group 1, at
differing time spans depending on their initial level of affluence. Simultaneously, the growth rate of affluence is
set to converge to the steady-state growth rate of ‘mature’  economies. Group 2, which is closest to the
affluence level of Group 1, reaches the average affluence level of Group 1 within 15 years. Group 3 countries
are given a 20-year, and Group 4 countries a 25-year, time span of convergence. As the countries in Groups 2–
4 converge to the affluence level of the ‘mature’  economies, their economic growth rate also converges to the
steady-state growth rate. Since convergence is simulated by the development of income per capita, total real
GDP for these countries for each year is calculated by multiplying the forecasted A by the forecasted P.
In our model, levering the steady-state growth rate of mature economies also affects the growth rate of
converging economies, as they catch up. Thus, in the model, changing the rate of economic growth in Group 1
also affects the other groups. This allows us to change the overall economic forecast for the region by altering
the steady-state growth rate. However, changing the rate does not change the intrinsic structural characteristics
4 Group 1: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, UK.
5 Group 2: Cyprus, Italy, Malta, Slovenia, Spain.
6 Group 3: Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal.
7 Group 4: Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Slovakia.
5of the model. To keep the economic and population scenarios independent of each other, the economic
forecasts are designed using the baseline population variant and are applied as such when combined with high
and low population variants.
To find the range of required c+t, we combine the three different population scenarios from Eurostat (2007a) with
five scenarios on economic growth. The baseline for economic growth is a scenario where the steady-state
growth of real GDP is set at 2% a year. In addition to this, we vary the growth rate, giving it values 1%, 1.5%,
2.5% and 3%.
3. Results
3.1. Development of emissions 1993–2004
Between 1993 and 2004, CO2 emissions in EU27 increased from 1126 Tg of C to 1172 Tg of C, annually on
average by 0.31% (Fig. 1, Appendices B and C). Affluence (A) in EU27 grew on average +2.22% per year and
was the strongest driver. Population (P) also grew slightly, with its growth rate averaging +0.23% per year.
Changes in the intensity of use (energy/GDP) and in intensity of emissions (CO2/energy) had a reducing impact
on emissions, on average -1.46% and -0.67% per year, respectively.
Fig. 1. Average annual changes in emissions, population, affluence, intensity of use and intensity of emissions (1993–2004).
While EU15 emissions increased at a rate of +0.69%, the emissions in NMS12 decreased by _1.27% annually
on average. In the new member states, declining trends of c and t were sufficient to compensate for the impact
of strong economic growth. A negative trend in population also slightly contributed to the declining trend in
emissions. In contrast, the population of EU15 slightly increased. Both c and t were negative also in EU15
states. EU15 accounted for almost 80%, or almost 90% of the population and economic output, respectively, of
the entire EU27 in 2004. The annual decrease of impact in the new member states was absorbed by the
stronger West European trend of growing impact, and only slightly mitigated the overall trend for EU27. In
6NMS12 countries, although the rates of dematerialization and decarbonization were high, the state variables C
and T (consumers’ intensity of use and technologists’ intensity of emissions) were about 40% less advanced
than the corresponding estimates for EU15 (Appendix C).
The change of emissions varied between countries (Fig. 2). Emissions increased in all countries in Group 2. In
Group 4, the least affluent countries, the growth in population and affluence was offset by development in c+t
and the emissions hence decreased. However, rate c+t varied greatly among countries in Group 4. The patterns
in Group 1 and 3 countries were mixed. In the six countries where CO2 emissions reduced fastest (Latvia,
Bulgaria, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, Poland), population shrank and downward forces of c and t were strong,
especially so in Latvia and Lithuania (Fig. 3).
Luxembourg, Estonia, Finland, Czech Republic, Belgium and Ireland had the highest CO2 emissions per capita
in 2004 (Fig. 2). In three of these countries, Finland, Belgium and Ireland, total emission grew (Appendices B
and C). In Ireland the strongest upward drivers were changes in population (1.2%/year) and affluence
(6.9%/year), whereas in Finland affluence grew at an annual rate of 3.5%, while carbon intensity of energy
production remained unchanged. In Belgium, population grew at the same rate as in Finland, but, despite slower
growth in affluence, the downward drivers (c and t) did not suffice to keep emissions in check.
Regarding population in individual EU countries, two distinct trends can be observed. All EU15 countries gained
population, although annual rates of change were generally fairly modest (with the exception of Ireland and
Luxembourg, where population grew fast). On the other hand, most new member states lost population.
Exceptions in this group are Cyprian and Maltese populations, whose annual growth rates were among the
highest in Europe. More specifically, the trend of shrinking populations can be pinned down to the East
European transition economies. In these countries, population remained constant or grew slightly only in
Slovenia and the Slovak Republic. Despite distinct population trends, the population all over Europe changed
only little compared to other components included in the identity. Average annual rates of change for all
countries fell within a 2.2 percentage point interval, ranging from -0.9% in Latvia to +1.3% in Cyprus.
Fig. 2. Average annual CO2 emissions per capita in EU27 at the beginning and the end of the study period.
7Fig. 3. Changes in population and affluence (p+a), and in dematerialization and decarbonization (c+t) in EU27 countries
during 1993–2004 (%/year). On the chart, nations below the boundary of (p+a)+(c+t) ¼ 0 more than met the sustainability
challenge of countering population and affluence change p+a with dematerialization and decarbonization c+t. Those above
the boundary failed. In the example of Ireland, the challenge of p+a was about 8, the progress c+t of _5 carried Ireland more
than half the way, but an unmet challenge of _3 remained. The post-Kyoto target of _20% by 2020 requires still more
progress according to our prognosis. In EU27, several nations met the sustainability challenge, but only Bulgaria, Latvia,
Lithuania were on track toward the post-Kyoto target, if the observed historical trend is continued.
Average growth of affluence was generally higher in the new member states than in EU15 countries, even
though real GDP per capita grew fastest in Ireland (+6.9% per year) and slowest in Bulgaria (+0.9%). All but two
NMS12 countries had GDP per capita growth rates above the EU27 median. For aggregate EU15, the growth of
affluence peaked in the late 1990s, but slowed down at the turn of the new millennium. On the contrary, apart
from great variation in annual growth rates in the early years, economic growth in the NMS12 generally
appeared to accelerate towards the end of the period in focus.
For most member states average c was below zero, with the exception of three countries: Portugal (1.9%), Spain
(0.7%) and Austria (0.5%). Italy had no change in C. A regional trend for c can be identified. Generally,
dematerialization was faster in new than in old member states.
8Similarly, decarbonization progressed in most countries. Only Malta and Cyprus ‘recarbonized’  (1.3% and 0.1%,
respectively). No change in T was observed in Finland. Differences in the rates of change between countries
were greater in average c than average t. While average t varied between -3.1% (in Latvia) and 1.3% (in Malta),
average c ranged in a greater interval from -5.9% in Lithuania to +1.9% in Portugal. In terms of t, the difference
between old and new member states was not clear-cut. Most EU15 countries tended to scatter around the
Union’s median rates of improving intensity of use and intensity of emission. The new member states, however,
showed a more polarized trend, with three countries among the top five improvers in all of EU27, but also, in
terms of t, four countries among the five weakest performing states. Throughout EU27, the combined annual
improvement in dematerialization+decarbonization — that is, change in CO2/GDP— varied greatly: from the fast
progress of -7.8% in Latvia to the retarding +0.6% in Portugal. Ireland was rather unique in terms of high p and
high a (Fig. 3, Appendix B).
3.2. Scenario analysis
If CO2 emissions in EU27 are to be reduced 20% below the 1990 level, this will need to happen in 2008–2020,
because in 1990–2007 the emissions did not change much. Average annual change of emissions during 12
years needs to be -1.75%. According to the scenarios for a and p in this study, the annual rate of
dematerialization and decarbonization, c+t, would need to be between -4.15% and -5.53% to meet the EU target
(Table 2). Approximately in the middle of this interval is the baseline option where population evolves according
to Eurostat’s baseline variant and the steady-state growth rate (r) is set at 2% for highly affluent, Group 1
countries. If the region experiences a strong economic downturn or boom within the next 12 years, the
sustainability challenge may well be beyond this range. To demonstrate this option, scenarios that incorporate
lower and higher economic rates were also included.
Estimating country-specific required annual rates of dematerialization and decarbonization and assessing the
likelihood of meeting them would require more detailed information on how the burden is to be shared among
the member states. However, compared to the historical development (Fig. 3), the combined rates of c+t would
have been sufficient in only three individual countries, should the countries have a unanimous goal of reducing
emissions by the same 20% in 12 years8. Of these countries, neither the small Baltic states (Latvia and
Lithuania) nor Bulgaria can be considered to be large enough to contribute strongly to the overall development of
regional emissions. Of the six most populous countries, only Poland was close to a sufficient rate. Emissions
also slightly decreased in Germany and the UK, but kept increasing in France, Italy and Spain. Thus, it is evident
that to reach the set emissions’ target, C and T must change fast all over the continent.
4. Discussion
Both the theory of climate change mitigation and policy and management applications rely on ‘efficiency’  and
‘substitution’  logic (Robe` rt et al., 2002; World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 2000;
Schmidheiny, 1992; Welford, 1998). An estimation of ‘sustainability challenge’  is a common approach in
evaluating the stringency of environmental goals and targets. It refers to the smallest required improvement in C
and T to compensate the environmental impact of growing population and affluence (Waggoner and Ausubel,
2002). Here we have followed the same approach.
Raupach et al. (2007) studied the global and regional drivers of CO2 emissions. Before the year 2000, in the
world as the whole, population and affluence increased at roughly equal rates, and dematerialization and
decarbonization occurred, the latter at a slower rate. Changes in C and T were not large enough to compensate
the growth in impact induced by changes in P and A.
Here we investigated in more detail the changes of P, A, C and T within EU27 (small letters p, a, c, t referring to
their change). During 1993–2004 in NMS12, high c reflected structural change and can be attributed to growing
GDP rather than to decreasing use of energy (Appendix D). Services grew faster than did the more energy-
8 The actual reduction requirement is likely to be slightly less than 20%, since EU27 CO2 emissions in 2008 are projected to
be slightly lower than in 1990.
9intensive sectors such as manufacturing and primary production. The energy consumption of manufacturing and
primary production declined. Also, the energy consumption of households decreased. The negative population
trend (Eurostat, 2007a) may have contributed to the declining energy consumption of households.
Table 2: Required rate of dematerialization and decarbonization, c+t (%/year), in EU27 during 2008–2020 according to
different projections
Projections for economic growth Development of population (Eurostat 2007a)
(steady state growth rate) Low population variant Baseline variant High population variant
Slow economic growth (1%) -3.73 -3.98 -4.30
Slightly lower growth (1.5%) -4.15 -4.39 -4.71
Baseline scenario (2%) -4.56 -4.81 -5.12
Slightly higher growth (2.5%) -4.97 -5.22 -5.53
High economic growth (3%) -5.37 -5.62 -5.94
In EU15, dematerialization progressed less well than in NMS12. Despite the growing volume of output in
manufacturing and primary production, their relative share of GDP declined. The manufacturing sector achieved
gains in energy efficiency, while primary production did not. Although the service sector grew more moderately in
EU15 than in NMS12, its relative share increased. The value added in service sector was the main driver of
economic growth in EU15. The absolute energy consumption of the service sector grew by 17%. This can mainly
be attributed to increasing transport. However, intensity of energy use in the service sector (incl. transport)
improved by approximately 10%, most of all sectors. The energy consumption of households grew. In EU15, the
energy mix changed on lowering t. The share of liquid fuels (oil) decreased from 48% to 43%, and that of solid
fuels from 23% to 19%, while the share of gas increased from 24% to 32%. The share of biofuels increased from
4% to 5%. The combustion efficiency of fuels slightly improved from 97.9 to 97.0 tonCO2/TJ (EEA, 2007),
responding mainly to improvements in coal burning. However, total fuel combustion increased by 13% during
1993–2004 (EEA, 2007). In all three sectors, growth in the absolute volume of energy consumption outweighed
the gains in dematerialization and decarbonization. Hence the emissions grew.
The changes in energy mix contributed to the decreasing T. In EU25, between years 1994–2004, the share of
CO2-intensive fuels of energy consumption declined: coal from 17.4% to 13.7% and oil from 39.7% to 37.2%
(Eurostat, 2007b). Instead, the shares of natural gas (from 18.4% to 23.9%) and nuclear energy (from 13.8% to
14.5%) increased. Especially in small countries, changes in electricity imports can affect the results.
In Germany, focusing on the largest nations, the energy efficiency of power and heating plants was improved
and the economy of the five new La¨nder was restructured after reunification. The United Kingdom switched from
oil and coal to gas in large scale in electricity production. Italian CO2 emissions increased primarily from road
transport, electricity and heat production. In France, CO2 emissions from road transport increased considerably.
Spain’s emissions responded to the growth on many sectors including electricity and heat production and
manufacturing industries. In Poland, as in other new Member States, heavy industry declined in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. Transport, especially road transport, increased everywhere and fuel efficiency hardly improved
(EEA, 2006).
By 2020, radical improvements of intensity of use and intensity of emissions are required in order to reduce the
emissions 20% below the level of 1990. A combined annual rate for c+t of -4.15% to -5.53% in the next 12 years
is simply too much in our opinion given the inertia of the economy. Such an improvement would mean a 1.9–2.6-
fold annual rate of dematerialization and decarbonization compared to the latest development (_2.13%/year)
within the whole of the EU27 region. Even more radical measures are needed, if the EU aims to reduce GHG
emissions by 30% with this time-table. Reducing CO2 emissions, this would mean an average rate of -
2.86%/year. According to the baseline population forecast by Eurostat and our baseline economic projection, the
combined rate of c+t would need to be -5.92%, 2.8-fold compared to that in the years 1993–2004. While
mitigating the emissions of CO2 from fossil-fuel combustion and industrial processes, the EU must address other
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GHGs and ecosystem sinks. Even so, reducing CO2 emissions by 15% (-1.24%/year) or merely by 10% (-
0.77%/year) would, according to the baseline projections, mean combined dematerialization and
decarbonization of -4.30%/year or -3.83%/year, respectively, thus exceeding the recent rates.
4.1. Reducing emissions
Better use of existing technologies will be crucial within the short time horizon toward 2020, since time will not
allow large-scale penetration of entirely new technologies. The structure of the economy changes slowly. The
volume of manufacturing may shrink in the future if production is transferred to countries where circumstances
for industrial production are more favourable; however, such a change might not stand for a reduction in
emissions on the global scale (Rothman, 1998). Also, attaining structural change in energy production is slow.
Structural change of the energy mix may contribute to reduction efforts, but will hardly be sufficient alone.
Finding ways to improve intensity of use and intensity of emissions of transport, along with curbing its volume, is
crucial because the transport sector is large and has grown rapidly.
Technologies which reduce the CO2 emissions from coal and gas-burning, such as carbon capture and storage,
can be developed. To improve energy efficiency, the Commission proposes tougher standards on appliances:
improved energy performance of the EU’s existing buildings and improved efficiency of heat and electricity
generation, transmission and distribution (European Commission, 2007a). Also, strengthening the EU emission
trading system is a proposed action to tackle the emissions (European Commission, 2007b). In order to tackle
transport emissions, measures addressing aviation and road traffic can be considered (European Commission,
2007b).
Besides CO2, there are reduction possibilities in other GHGs as well. For example, Delhotal et al. (2006) discuss
the ability to significantly reduce methane and nitrous oxide emissions from waste, energy and industrial sectors
with current technologies. They stress the low cost of methane and nitrous oxide reductions relative to CO2
reductions.
Fig. 4. Annual CO2 emissions in 2004 and estimated net sequestration in woody vegetation (above-ground) in EU27
countries (excl. Malta) in 1990–2005. Data source for estimate: FRA 2005 country tables, growing stock in forest.
Calculations were conducted according to the forest identity (Kauppi et al. 2006) utilizing values B = 0.9 (ton biomass/m3 of
growing stock) and C = 0.5 (ton carbon/ton dry biomass). Roots or forest soil are not included in the sink estimate.
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Ecosystem sinks can play a role in tackling climate change. During 1990–2005 in EU27, the above-ground tree
vegetation expanded at an annual rate of approximately 126 TgC/year, thus absorbing a flux which equals about
11% of the fossil emissions (Fig. 4). The rate was 10% and 15% in EU15 and in NMS12, respectively. The sink
in relation to emissions varied greatly among the countries, offsetting the per capita emissions in Latvia and
accounting for a large fraction of emissions in Sweden, Lithuania, Slovenia, Finland and Bulgaria. Sequestration
is likely to continue, because of the inertia of change in forest area and biomass (Kauppi et al., 2006).
Agricultural and forest policies have affected forest trends in the past and can have an effect also during 2008–
2020.
4.2. Uncertainties
The ImPACT method identifies the key driving forces behind the emissions. However, the ImPACT method is
also susceptible to criticism. For example, CO2/energy as a measure of technology is affected by the changes in
the energy mix in addition to changes in the actual technology. Adverse environmental impacts of e.g. imported
electricity, nuclear energy, renewable fuels and hydropower are not included in this analysis, but, in reality, they
must also be assessed when evaluating the environmental performance of the energy system in a more
complete manner. Also, a number of country-specific features like urbanization level and industrial structure are
not inherent in this model. However, increasing the amount of attributes would reduce the level of simplicity.
Some of the strengths and weaknesses of ImPACT and its variants are discussed e.g. by York et al. (2003).
This study covers only CO2 emissions, not other GHGs. CO2 emissions are better documented than other GHGs,
and their link to energy consumption and the standard of living is more direct than is the case with the other
GHGs.
The projections developed and used in order to estimate the future development of population and economy add
uncertainty to our calculations. It is difficult to predict the regional or country-specific economic cycles that the
EU27 will encounter in the next 12 years, or the annual real growth rates of individual countries’ economies.
However, the policy makers are faced with the same constraints. The model illustrates the difficulty of policy
making in such a long term.
There are limitations to the reliability of the economic forecasts, due to the strong structural and dynamic
assumptions incorporated in the model. Regarding economic growth, it seems reasonable to expect that East
European transition economies grow faster than their West European counterparts, and, compared to historical
data, a long-run real GDP growth rate of 2% for the most affluent countries seems a plausible forecast for the
near future. However, the forecast model is sensitive to changes in its structure and the performance of
individual countries. Also, strong emission reductions themselves may affect the economy of a country. In this
study, however, it was not possible to evaluate such effects.
The structure of the used model asserts that economic growth in converging economies is dependent on the
development of the economy in Group 1 countries. In reality, economic performance in Group 1 and Groups 2–4
need not be (and is not) interlinked in this particular way. The simple grouping of countries by affluence level, the
predetermined time span of convergence and the dependency structure within in the model, however, help us
find rough projections for the EU27 as a whole. Since the predictions are made by combining separate scenarios
for the evolution of population and the economy in different countries, the model is rather rigid. Due to a great
amount of uncertainty and rigidity, it is not meaningful at this stage to view the economic projections at country
level. However, the sensitivity analysis suggests that the rates have to improve compared to the historical
record.
5. Conclusions
Fossil emissions of CO2 did not change much in Europe in 1993–2004, even though the development of
emissions and their drivers varied markedly between member states of the European Union. Changes in the
consumers’ intensity of use (energy/GDP) and technologists’ intensity of emissions (CO2/energy) had a negative
impact on emissions, on average -1.46% and -0.67%/year, respectively. However, affluence grew on average
2.22%/year, and population by 0.23%/year, more than offsetting the efficiency gains. Between countries, c
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varied the most, from -5.9% to 1.9% annually. Also, a varied considerably from 0.9% to 6.9%/year and average t
from -3.1% to 1.3%/year. Population growth did not vary that much between countries, from -0.9% to 1.3%/year.
While the emissions of old member states (EU15) showed an inclining trend of 0.69%, the emissions of new
members states (NMS12) decreased by -1.27% per year. In NMS12, declining trends of c and t levelled off the
impact of strong economic growth. A negative trend in population also slightly contributed to the declining trend
in emissions in NMS12. In EU15 both dematerialization and decarbonization made progress but the rates of
improvement were modest. The emissions per capita were 16.9% lower in NMS12 than in EU15 in 2004.
Prospects within the time frame until 2020 of reducing CO2 emissions by 20% are not good. A declining trend of
emissions has not started yet. Time is running short for achieving such an ambitious goal. The reduction in CO2
emissions per output would need to be 1.9–2.6 times faster in the next 12 years compared to that in years 1993–
2004. Therefore, in addition to addressing the fossil emissions, we encourage the national governments of
Europe to focus on agricultural and forest policy and waste management in order to address the emissions of
non-CO2 green house gases and further to enhance the considerable role of ecosystem biomass as a carbon
sink. By 2020, the combined impact of mitigation measures may reduce the European burden on radiative
forcing by 20% or more, even though reaching this goal by addressing fossil CO2 emissions alone is very
unlikely.
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where n is the length of the studied time period (in this case 11 years). Respectively, the formulae for the











































































































































































































































Average annual rates of change (log%) in emissions, population, affluence, intensity of use and intensity of
emissions (1993–2004) of different countries is shown in Table B1.
Table B1
Country Average annual rates of change log%
i p a c t
Austria 2.3 0.2 1.9 0.5 -0.3
Belgium 0.3 0.3 1.9 -1.2 -0.7
Bulgaria -2.3 -0.8 0.9 -2.3 -0.1
Cyprus 3.2 1.3 2.8 -1.1 0.1
Czech Republic -0.6 -0.1 2.1 -2.2 -0.3
Denmark -1.0 0.4 1.9 -1.9 -1.4
Estonia -1.7 -0.9 5.3 -4.9 -1.2
Finland 1.8 0.3 3.5 -2.1 0.0
France 0.6 0.4 1.9 -1.2 -0.6
Germany -0.4 0.1 1.3 -1.4 -0.5
Greece 2.5 0.5 3.0 -0.6 -0.4
Hungary -0.4 -0.2 3.6 -2.2 -1.5
Ireland 3.1 1.2 6.9 -3.7 -1.3
Italy 1.3 0.1 1.5 0.0 -0.4
Latvia -3.7 -0.9 5.0 -4.7 -3.1
Lithuania -2.0 -0.6 5.0 -5.9 -0.5
Luxembourg -0.3 1.2 3.7 -3.3 -2.0
Malta 2.0 0.9 2.8 -2.9 1.3
Netherlands 0.7 0.6 2.0 -1.5 -0.4
Poland -1.5 -0.1 4.2 -5.5 -0.1
Portugal 3.2 0.5 2.1 1.9 -1.3
Romania -1.6 -0.2 2.6 -2.5 -1.5
Slovak Republic -0.9 0.1 3.7 -3.7 -1.0
Slovenia 1.3 0.0 3.8 -1.4 -1.1
Spain 3.6 0.7 2.8 0.7 -0.6
Sweden -0.4 0.2 2.6 -2.6 -0.6
UK -0.1 0.3 2.6 -2.3 -0.7
EU-15 0.69 0.34 2.02 -1.11 -0.55
NMS12 -1.27 -0.22 3.37 -3.71 -0.72
EU-27 0.31 0.22 2.22 -1.46 -0.67
Countries with negative annual
average rates 14 8 0 23 24
Countries with positive annual
average rates 13 18 27 3 2
Countries with no change 0 1 0 1 1
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Appendix C
Values of components for 3-year averages in carbon emissions, population, GDP and energy consumption is
shown in Table C1.
Table C1
Values of components for three-year averages in
Carbon Emissions, Population, GDP and Energy Consumption
Country At the beginning of study period (1993–1995) At the end of study period (2002–2004)
I P A C T I P A C T
Austria 16.8 7,930 23.5 10.9×10-8 8.3×10-4 20.6 8,106 27.8 11.4×10-8 8.0×10-4
Belgium 33.3 10,112 21.4 15.6×10-8 9.8×10-4 34.3 10,368 25.4 14.1×10-8 9.3×10-4
Bulgaria 17.4 8,441 7.4 17.7×10-8 15.9×10-4 14.2 7,831 8.0 14.4×10-8 15.7×10-4
Cyprus 1.5 639 18.3 11.5×10-8 11.3×10-4 2.0 721 23.6 10.4×10-8 11.5×10-4
Czech R. 36.4 10,330 12.2 20.3×10-8 14.2×10-4 34.5 10,208 14.7 16.7×10-8 13.8×10-4
Denmark 16.7 5,209 23.7 11.8×10-8 11.5×10-4 15.2 5,388 28.1 9.9×10-8 10.2×10-4
Estonia 5.8 1,464 8.4 22.2×10-8 21.1×10-4 5.0 1,354 13.6 14.2×10-8 19.0×10-4
Finland 16.0 5,088 17.5 24.7×10-8 7.3×10-4 18.8 5,211 24.0 20.5×10-8 7.3×10-4
France 105.7 57,657 21.7 11.2×10-8 7.5×10-4 111.5 59,944 25.8 10.1×10-8 7.1×10-4
Germany 252.8 81,424 22.5 12.0×10-8 11.5×10-4 244.0 82,518 25.4 10.6×10-8 11.0×10-4
Greece 23.6 10,551 12.1 12.1×10-8 15.3×10-4 29.6 11,017 15.9 11.5×10-8 14.8×10-4
Hungary 17.1 10,343 9.5 16.0×10-8 10.9×10-4 16.4 10,135 13.1 13.1×10-8 9.5×10-4
Ireland 9.4 3,592 15.2 14.1×10-8 12.2×10-4 12.4 3,985 28.3 10.2×10-8 10.9×10-4
Italy 117.6 56,841 20.2 9.7×10-8 10.6×10-4 131.7 57,550 23.2 9.7×10-8 10.2×10-4
Latvia 2.8 2,523 7.1 22.1×10-8 7.2×10-4 2.0 2,328 11.2 14.4×10-8 5.5×10-4
Lithuania 4.3 3,656 7.5 17.3×10-8 9.0×10-4 3.5 3,456 11.7 10.2×10-8 8.6×10-4
Luxembourg 3.0 403 35.7 23.9×10-8 8.8×10-4 3.0 449 50.0 17.9×10-8 7.4×10-4
Malta 0.6 368 14.8 7.9×10-8 14.5×10-4 0.8 398 19.0 6.1×10-8 16.3×10-4
Netherlands 45.8 15,377 21.9 13.9×10-8 9.8×10-4 48.8 16,211 26.2 12.1×10-8 9.5×10-4
Poland 101.7 38,533 6.4 25.5×10-8 16.1×10-4 88.5 38,209 9.4 15.6×10-8 15.9×10-4
Portugal 13.6 10,006 14.4 8.8×10-8 10.8×10-4 18.1 10,428 17.4 10.5×10-8 9.6×10-4
Romania 35.9 22,211 5.0 22.2×10-8 14.6×10-4 31.1 21,752 6.3 17.8×10-8 12.7×10-4
Slovak R. 12.0 5,345 7.9 25.7×10-8 11.1×10-4 11.1 5,380 11.0 18.5×10-8 10.2×10-4
Slovenia 3.9 1,990 13.7 13.8×10-8 10.4×10-4 4.4 1,996 19.3 12.2×10-8 9.4×10-4
Spain 66.7 39,290 16.2 9.7×10-8 10.8×10-4 92.4 41,888 20.8 10.4×10-8 10.3×10-4
Sweden 15.7 8,775 21.0 18.0×10-8 4.8×10-4 15.2 8,953 26.4 14.2×10-8 4.5×10-4
UK 152.4 57,868 20.5 12.0×10-8 10.7×10-4 151.0 59,516 26.0 9.7×10-8 10.1×10-4
EU-15 889.3 370,124 20.3 11.8×10-8 10.1×10-4 946.7 381,534 24.4 10.6×10-8 9.6×10-4
NMS12 239.5 105,843 7.4 21.3×10-8 14.3×10-4 213.6 103,768 10.1 15.3×10-8 13.4×10-4
EU-27 1128.8 475,967 17.5 12.7×10-8 10.7×10-4 1160.2 485,302 21.3 11.1×10-8 10.1×10-4
I = CO2 emissions in Tg of C
P = Population (thousands)
A = GDP per capita in year 2000 international $ (thousands)
C = Energy consumption (TOE) per GDP in year 2000 international $
T = CO2 emissions in Tg of C per Energy consumption (TOE)
16
Appendix D
Different sectors’ share of total energy consumption, and increase in absolute volume of consumption 1995–
2005 is shown in Table D1.
Table D1
Share of total Energy
consumption 1995
Share of total Energy
consumption 2005
Change in volume of
energy consumption
EU27 Primary production 3.3% 2.8% -6.3%
Manufacturing 30.3% 27.6% 0.0%
Services (incl. transport) 38.8% 42.2% 19.4%
Services (excl.
transport) 10.6% 11.3% 16.1%
Transport 28.1% 31.0% 20.7%
Households 26.5% 26.6% 9.8%
Other 1.1% 0.8% -22.9%
EU15 Primary production 2.8% 2.6% 3.6%
Manufacturing 28.6% 27.1% 5.9%
Services (incl. transport) 41.7% 43.5% 17.0%
Services (excl.
transport) 11.0% 11.2% 13.9%
Transport 30.7% 32.3% 18.0%
Households 25.8% 26.0% 13.0%
Other 1.1% 0.8% -16.0%
NMS12 Primary production 5.9% 4.2% -31.4%
Manufacturing 39.0% 31.0% -22.8%
Services (incl. transport) 23.3% 34.2% 42.7%
Services (excl.
transport) 8.5% 11.5% 30.6%
Transport 14.8% 22.7% 49.7%
Households 30.2% 29.7% -4.4%




Share of different sectors’ shares of GDP, and increase in real volume of output 1995–2005 is shown in Table
E1.
Table E1
Share of GDP 1995 Share of GDP 2005
Change in volume of
value added by sector
EU27 Primary production 3.8% 3.1% 3.3%
Manufacturing 12.1% 10.4% 7.9%
Services (incl. transport) 66.9% 69.1% 29.5%
Other 17.3% 17.3% 25.8%
EU15 Primary production 3.5% 2.9% 2.9%
Manufacturing 12.0% 10.4% 7.5%
Services (incl. transport) 67.3% 69.7% 28.8%
Other 17.1% 17.0% 23.3%
NMS12 Primary production 10.9% 7.9% 6.8%
Manufacturing 12.4% 9.9% 17.7%
Services (incl. transport) 56.0% 57.2% 50.4%
Other 20.7% 24.9% 76.9%
 Source: Eurostat, 2007b.
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